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SAA29LA01-003

B/L: 131.80

REV. A

DEC 2 0 1991

SYS: BALL/BAR LIGHTS (PORTABLE SYSTEM)

Critical (tem:

Variable Transformer (6 Items Total)

Find Number:

AT3, AT4

Criticality Category:

1 (Night Landing Only)

SAA Na:

29LA01-003

System/Area:

Visual Landing Aids at SLS #1

NASA

PMN/

U72-1338-02

Part No:

Name:

Ball Lights

Mfa/ Part No: Technipower W5L

Drawing/

80K51889

Sheet No:

Function: Each transformer provides controlled voltage to one of the ball lights.

Critical Fallure Mode/Failure Mode No: Fails short to ground/29LA01-003.030, 29LA01-003.031, 29LA01-003.032.

Failure Cause: Structural Failure/Contemination/Corrosion

Fallure Effect: Disconnect switch fuse S1B will open resulting in loss of power to ball lights 1 and 2, and bar light assemblies 2, 4 and 6. Loss of ability to acquire and maintain the proper Inner glideslope during landing operations. Possible loss of tile/vehicle.

Time to Effect: Immediate, during outer glideslope use.

## ACCEPTANCE RATIONALE

Design:	Raind	Estimated Operating
	Voltage = 0 to 120 Volta	56.3 Volta Output
	Current - 13 Amps Max.	6.7 Amps Output

o Transformer is mounted in a NEMA 4 Hoffman enclosure.

Test: Meets requirements of MIL-STD-202, "Test Methods for Electronic and Electrical Components.\* Tested for vibration, shock, dielectric and rotational life in accordance with MIL-STD-202

 The OMRSD, File VI will require verification of proper operation prior to each operational. use.

WORKSHEET 5122-012 910428bbPS0012 710.3989

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 GEGS Technical Directives TD 1-4 and 1-5 require verification of proper operation the day before, and again the day of Shuttle training aircraft and Orbiter landing operations.

Inspection: GEGS Technical Directives will require that equipment is physically inspected for corrosion, contamination and/or physical damage annually.

## Failure History:

- The PRACA database was researched and no failure data was found on this component in the critical failure mode.
- The GIDEP failure data interchange system was researched and no failure data was found on this component in the critical failure mode.

## Operational Use:

Correcting Action:

There is no action which can be taken to mitigate the failure effect.

Timeframe:

Since no correcting action is available, timeframe does not apply.

WORKSHEET 5122-012 61042855PS0012 CR SOSOLS4 RTTACHMENT SHEET BOFS